Three experiments examined the effects of task switching and response correspondence in a psychological refractory period paradigm. A letter task (vowel-consonant) and a digit task (odd-even) were combined to form 4 possible dual-task pairs in each trial: letter-letter, letter-digit, digit-digit, and digit-letter. Foreknowledge of task transition (repeat or switch) and task identity (letter or digit) was varied across experiments: no foreknowledge in Experiment 1, partial foreknowledge (task transition only) in Experiment 2, and full foreknowledge in Experiment 3. For all experiments, the switch cost for Task 2 was additive with stimulus onset asynchrony, and the response-correspondence effect for Task 2 was numerically smaller in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. These outcomes suggest that reconfiguration for Task 2 takes place after the central processing of Task 1 and that the crosstalk correspondence effect is due to response activation by way of stimulus-response associations.
Humans have difficulty performing the second of two different tasks when they are presented sequentially and even more so when they are presented with some temporal overlap. The first phenomenon is called the task-switching effect (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Monsell & Driver, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) , whereas the second phenomenon is called the psychological refractory period (PRP) effect (e.g., Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Pashler, 1984 Pashler, , 1998 . Although task-switching and PRP effects have generally been studied independently, they have commonalities. First, there are costs in performing the second of two different tasks, even when there is full task knowledge and sufficient time to prepare the upcoming task(s). Second, both effects have been shown to be affected by the correspondence between responses for the first and second of two successive tasks (Hommel, 1998; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Logan & Schulkind, 2000; Meiran, 2000b; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) .
Nevertheless, conclusions about task-switching and PRP effects have usually been drawn independently. It has been suggested that the task-switching effect is associated with proactive interference from the previous task set (task set inertia; Allport et al., 1994) , the need to reconfigure a new task set (online reconfiguration; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) , or response competition elicited by stimuli from the two task sets (stimulus-response association; e.g., Allport & Wylie, 2000; see Meiran, 2000b; Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000 , for reviews of different sources of switch costs). On the other hand, the PRP effect has often been attributed to a central bottleneck, which is assumed to process only one task at a time (Pashler, 1984; Welford, 1952) . More recently, a modification of the central bottleneck has been proposed to account for the finding that the response for the first task (Task 1, or T1) is faster when the response for the second task (Task 2, or T2) corresponds to it than when it does not (Hommel, 1998; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Logan & Schulkind, 2000) . This model assumes that the response for T2 is activated simultaneously with central processing of T1 (i.e., it is not delayed pending central processing of T1), but the final response selection for T2 is delayed until after the final response selection for T1 has been completed.
Because the PRP paradigm typically uses different tasks for T1 and T2, participants have to switch tasks every trial. One might question, therefore, whether the PRP delay is caused by the need to switch tasks in the PRP paradigm. A non-PRP study by Pashler (1994) revealed that a processing delay still occurs when the same task is repeated in a series of trials. Thus, task switching may not be the sole cause of the PRP effect. However, it may still contribute to the PRP effect. Consequently, the relation among taskswitching effects, correspondence effects, and the PRP effect needs to be investigated. The present study examines relations among these effects.
Task-Switching Studies
Results of several studies have shown that the switch cost is affected by response competition elicited by stimuli from the two task sets (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Goschke, 2000; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) . In Rogers and Monsell's study, an even-odd digit task and a consonant-vowel letter task were used. One response key was assigned to "even" and "consonant," and the other response key was assigned to "odd" and "vowel." On each trial a pair of stimuli was presented in one quadrant of a square, with one of the two stimuli being irrelevant. The irrelevant stimulus in the pair could indicate the same response as the relevant stimulus (congruent), the opposite response (incongruent), or it could be a neutral character. Across successive trials, the quadrant in which the pair appeared rotated in a clockwise manner, with the two top positions indicating one task and the two bottom positions indicating the other task to be performed. As a result, the repeat trials and switch trials were intermixed within a block, with the task sequence (e.g., AABB) known in advance.
Even with task sequence known in advance and a responsestimulus interval (RSI) of 1,200 ms, Rogers and Monsell (1995) still found a substantial switch cost. This finding, known as the residual switch cost, led Rogers and Monsell to hypothesize that a stimulus-triggered reconfiguration is needed when the current task is different from the previous one but not when it is repeated. Although Rogers and Monsell also found a smaller switch cost for those trials in which the irrelevant stimuli were neutral (the noncrosstalk trials) than for those in which they were congruent or incongruent (the crosstalk trials), a residual switch cost was still obtained for the noncrosstalk trials at 1,200-ms RSI. These results suggest that switch cost is affected by the presence of crosstalk, but the residual component of the switch cost does not arise solely from the need to suppress crosstalk. Rogers and Monsell (1995) further examined the effect of response repetitions from one task to another in both repeat and switch conditions across experiments (see their Table 7, p. 226). The usual response-repetition benefit was obtained in the taskrepeat conditions for all experiments: Responses were faster when they were the same as in the previous task. However, an opposite pattern was observed in the task-switch condition for most of their experiments: There was a trend toward a faster response time (RT) when the response was different from the response made in the previous task (see also Meiran, 2000a) . The error rate in five experiments was also larger when the response was repeated in the task-switch condition. Rogers and Monsell explained the lack of response-repetition benefit in the switch condition by assuming that an inhibitory mechanism operated to prevent reexecution of the same response as the previous task. Thus, the online reconfiguration, which is needed for task switches but not for task repetitions, may involve the suppression of all active responses engaged in the previous task (i.e., the right-keypress response made in the previous task). Consequently, extra response activation is required to overcome the response inhibition in the switch condition, resulting in slower RTs when the responses repeat.
Similar findings of a residual switch cost and a lack of response repetition benefit in the switch trials were also obtained by Sohn and Carlson (2000) . They used a task-switching paradigm containing only two tasks (T1 and T2), the even-odd digit task and consonant-vowel letter task from Rogers and Monsell's (1995) study, separated by 1,000-ms RSI in each trial. Similar to Rogers and Monsell's design, the same response key was assigned to "even" and "consonant" and the other response key was assigned to "odd" and "vowel." For each task, a stimulus consisted of one letter and one digit (e.g., G7), with the color of the stimulus being varied as a cue indicating whether the letter task or digit task was to be performed. Thus, responses associated with the irrelevant and relevant stimuli could be either congruent or incongruent. The foreknowledge of task transition (repeat or switch tasks) and task identity (a digit or letter task) on T2 was manipulated across experiments.
In Experiment 1, Sohn and Carlson (2000) blocked the foreknowledge of task transition from T1 to T2 for half of the participants. Consequently, the identity of T2 could be inferred from the identity of T1. The other half of the participants, however, had no task foreknowledge. The results showed an equivalent switch cost on T2 for both groups. Similar effects were also obtained in Experiment 2 when the foreknowledge of task identity for T2 (letter vs. digit) was blocked. As in Allport et al. (1994) , Sohn and Carlson argued that the switch cost is not due to inadequate preparation for a task switch but to persisting activation of the previous task, which is independent from the effect of foreknowledge. Similar to Rogers and Monsell's (1995) results, Sohn and Carlson's Experiment 2 showed that when T2 was different from T1, responses on T2 were faster when an irrelevant stimulus was associated with the incongruent response than when it was associated with a congruent response. An opposite pattern was found when T2 was repeated from T1. That is, responses on T2 were faster when the irrelevant stimulus was associated with a congruent response than when it was associated with an incongruent response. In addition, this crosstalk effect was not affected by the foreknowledge of task transition, suggesting that the crosstalk effect primarily affects processing stages after task-set preparation.
Although the task-switch cost is a robust phenomenon, a taskswitch benefit 1 is sometimes found instead (e.g., Jersild, 1927; Lien & Ruthruff, 2003) . For example, Jersild suggested that a switch benefit was associated with the preview of stimulus sets. In his experiment, one task was to respond to a word by saying its opposite and the other task was to respond to a number by subtracting 3. All the stimuli for all the trials were presented on cards, and the spatial arrangement of stimuli was manipulated. On one side of the card, the separate task condition, the stimuli were presented in the form of one column of words and one column of numbers. On the other side of the card, the task-switch condition, the stimuli were presented in two columns, but each column consisted of words and numbers in alternation. Responses were faster for the switch condition than for the separate task condition. Jersild accounted for the increase in speed in terms of a balance between factors at work in the tasks. Because the stimuli for all the trials were visible to participants on the cards, processing on the next task could begin while participants were still processing the current task, thus increasing the speed of the response for the next task. An opposing factor is that as participants proceeded through the separate list of words or digits, memories of associations for both relevant and irrelevant stimuli accumulated. The alternation of stimuli in the switch condition dilutes the harmful effect of these associations. Consequently, the cost or benefit of task switching will depend on the relative amount of reduction of interference. Consistent with Jersild's explanation, Spector and Biederman (1976) also obtained a benefit from task switching when stimuli could be previewed.
Psychological Refractory Period Studies
Different from task-switching studies, tasks overlap to some extent in the PRP paradigm, with the stimulus (S2) for T2 presented shortly after the onset of the stimulus (S1) for T1. The time interval between the onsets of S1 and S2 (stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA) is varied, and RT is measured for each task (RT1 and RT2, for T1 and T2, respectively). This task arrangement, therefore, allows S2 to be previewed on some trials when T1 is still being processed, which, according to Jersild (1927) , may result in faster RT2 when T2 is switched from T1 than when it is repeated. However, typical PRP studies lack the appropriate control condition (i.e., the same tasks used for T1 and T2) needed to determine whether switching tasks in the PRP paradigm sometimes benefits performance. It is commonly found within the PRP paradigm that RT2 is longer at the short SOAs than at the long SOAs, called the PRP effect (Telford, 1931) .
The basis of the PRP effect has been a source of debate since the middle of the 20th century. Most explanations of the PRP effect attribute it either to a limited capacity that forces some processes for the two tasks to proceed more slowly than they would if each task were performed in isolation (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Navon & Miller, 2002; Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2003) or to a bottleneck that can only process one task at a time (e.g., Welford, 1952) . The bottleneck is usually claimed to occur either at the central processing stage (e.g., Pashler, 1984; Welford, 1952) , the peripheral stage of response production (e.g., Kantowitz, 1974; Keele, 1973; Meyer & Kieras, 1997) , or both central processing and response production (e.g., De Jong, 1993; Schweickert, 1978 Schweickert, , 1983 ).
An appealing account for the PRP effect is that central processing (e.g., response selection, memory retrieval) can proceed for only one task at a time (the traditional central bottleneck model as illustrated in Figure 1A ). Because participants are typically instructed to emphasize T1, the central processing is assumed to be allocated to T1 initially, resulting in slack time between the perceptual and central stages in T2 (Pashler, 1984; Schweickert, 1978) . Following locus of slack logic, initially developed by The modified central bottleneck model. This model assumes that the central processing stage involves response activation (B1 i and B2 i ) and intentional response selection (B1 j and B2 j ), with the bottleneck located at the intentional response-selection stage. A1, B1 (i and j) , and C1 are, respectively, early peripheral, central, and late peripheral processing of Task 1. A2, B2 (i and j) , and C2 are corresponding processes for Task 2. S1 ϭ stimulus for Task 1; S2 ϭ stimulus for Task 2; R1 ϭ response for Task 1; R2 ϭ response for Task 2; RT1 ϭ response time for Task 1; RT2 ϭ response time for Task 2; SOA ϭ stimulus onset asynchrony. Schweickert (1978) , any variable selectively influencing the central processing of T2 will show an additive effect with SOA on RT2. However, any variable selectively influencing a process prior to the central processing of T2 will have an interactive effect with SOA on RT2 because the effect of the variable can be absorbed into the slack between processes. (The form of the interaction depends on the location of the process selectively influenced by the variable; see Pashler, 1984 , for a review.) Pashler and Johnston (1989) provided evidence confirming the predicted interaction of a T2 perceptual variable with SOA, with the effect of the perceptual variable increasing as SOA increased, and the additive effect of a T2 response selection variable with SOA.
Using the locus of slack logic, Pashler (1994; Experiment 2) found similar results with a non-PRP paradigm, in which the same task was performed repeatedly in an uninterrupted series of trials with preview or no preview. In the preview condition, the stimulus on trial N appeared after participants made a response to trial N Ϫ 2 (except for the first two stimuli in each series). Note that in the preview condition, the model in Figure 1A can be applied to the processing on trials N Ϫ 1 and N. In the no-preview condition, each stimulus appeared only after participants made a response to the previous one. The interresponse interval (IRI) between trials was measured. Pashler found that preview (which is analogous to the SOA manipulation in the PRP paradigm) reduced the effect of a perceptual variable (e.g., bright vs. dim stimuli) but not the effect of a response-selection variable (e.g., easy vs. hard stimulusresponse mapping). These findings suggest that the perceptual processing for a task can start before the central processing for the preceding task is completed, but the central processing for a task cannot. Because only one task was used in Pashler's study, his results provide evidence that a processing delay occurs even when no task switch is required.
In addition, the traditional central bottleneck model as illustrated in Figure 1A implies that RT1 should not be affected by T2 response selection because the response for T2 is selected after the response selection for T1 is completed. However, recent PRP studies have shown RT1 to be faster when the response for T2 corresponded with the response for T1 than when it did not, which has been called the crosstalk correspondence effect (Hommel, 1998; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Logan & Schulkind, 2000) . The studies of the crosstalk correspondence effect in the PRP paradigm suggest that the central bottleneck model depicted in Figure 1A is oversimplified and that the central processing stage may consist of two components. One component is response activation that can occur simultaneously for B1 i and B2 i , whereas the other is intentional response selection that involves a bottleneck (B1 j and B2 j for T1 and T2, respectively; see Figure 1B for the modified central bottleneck model). Because the response activation is simultaneous for both tasks, the response activation for T2 affects the processing of T1, and vice versa. Consequently, responses are faster for both tasks when the response codes for T1 and T2 are the same than when they are different; particularly, this correspondence effect will be larger when the temporal overlap between the processing of T1 and T2 increases (i.e., at short SOAs; see also Lien & Proctor, 2002 , for a review). Note that if two central processes have their activation affected by correspondence, and if this goes on longer when the SOA affords greater temporal overlap between T1 and T2, we do not expect correspondence to selectively influence a single process. Indeed, if crosstalk is present, predictions that are based on selective influence are not necessarily expected to hold.
Regardless of whether response correspondence selectively influences some process, if the effect of response correspondence in the PRP paradigm has the same form as the effect of response repetition in single-task paradigms, RT2 should be faster when the responses for T1 and T2 do not correspond than when they do in the switch conditions. That is, a reverse response-correspondence effect should be observed when there is a task switch. Yet, this has not been the case in the PRP studies (Hommel, 1998; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Logan & Schulkind, 2000) that have examined correspondence effects and found positive effects when two different tasks were used for T1 and T2.
The Present Study
Considerable research has been conducted on the task switching and PRP effects individually, as well as their relations with correspondence effects. The study reported here attempts to provide a more complete understanding of these three effects. All experiments used a PRP paradigm. The two tasks were those used by Rogers and Monsell (1995) : classifying a letter as a vowel or consonant (the letter task) and classifying a digit as odd or even (the digit task). Conditions in which T1 and T2 were the same task were compared with conditions in which they were different tasks, with task foreknowledge varied across experiments. Participants responded to S1 by using the left hand to press one of two keys and to S2 by using the right hand to press one of two other keys. In the response-correspondence condition, both tasks required the leftmost response of each hand or both tasks required the rightmost response of each hand. In the response-noncorrespondence condition, the response locations for the two tasks did not correspond. In what follows, we refer to response correspondence simply as correspondence.
To examine how task foreknowledge affects switch costs and correspondence effects in the PRP paradigm, the foreknowledge of task transition (repeat or switch) and task identity was manipulated across three PRP experiments. In Experiment 1, each block contained all possible task pairs, digit-digit (DD), digit-letter (DL), letter-digit (LD), and letter-letter (LL), randomly intermixed; participants were unable to predict what the particular task(s) for the trial would be (i.e., no foreknowledge). Thus, preparation for T1 and T2 could not start until the onset of S1 and S2, respectively. In Experiment 2, half the blocks consisted entirely of trials for which T1 and T2 were the same task (i.e., DD and LL pairs) and half consisted entirely of trials for which T1 and T2 were different tasks (i.e., DL and LD pairs). Thus, participants could, in principle, begin to prepare T2 after the presentation of S1 (partial foreknowledge). In Experiment 3, each block contained only one of the possible task pairs (e.g., DD pairs); participants knew in advance what the particular tasks for T1 and T2 would be (full foreknowledge). Thus, the preparation for both tasks could, in principle, be completed even before the onset of S1. Across the experiments, then, the advance preparation for T2 became more specific, which allowed us to examine how the task switch, correspondence, and PRP effects on T2 were affected by task foreknowledge.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, we examined the task-switch and correspondence effects in the PRP paradigm when participants had no foreknowledge of the task transition (switch or repeat) and task identity (a digit or letter task). The SOA between the two tasks varied from 50 ms to 800 ms. Participants were asked to classify a digit as odd or even in the digit task and a letter as a vowel or consonant in the letter task. The combination of T1 and T2 could be one of four task pairs, DD, DL, LL, and LD, with the combination varying randomly from trial to trial. This allowed us to evaluate the cost of a task switch when there was no foreknowledge about the task transition and task identity between and within each trial. Because there was no foreknowledge of task transition and task identity, task switching could not occur prior to the determination of the identity of S2. An additive effect of SOA and switching between T1 and T2 would support a model in which task switching occurs after the central processing of T1. Moreover, if the correspondence effect in the PRP paradigm has the same form as the response repetition effect in single-task paradigms, RT2 should be faster in the noncorrespondence condition than in the correspondence condition for the switch conditions. For the repeat condition, however, RT2 should be slower in the noncorrespondence condition than in the correspondence condition.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight Purdue University undergraduates participated in partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement. They had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Apparatus and stimuli. The stimuli were presented on IBM-compatible personal computers with EGA monitors, using Micro Experimental Laboratory Version 2.0 (MEL2) software (Schneider, 1995) . Each character was 0.5 cm in width and 0.8 cm in height. Characters were displayed in an uppercase Roman font from the font file supplied by MEL2. On the basis of a viewing distance of approximately 55 cm, each character subtended approximately 0.52°width ϫ 0.83°height. For the letter classification task, the letter was a consonant (G, K, M, or R) or a vowel (A, E, I, or U). For the digit classification task, the digit was odd (3, 5, 7, or 9) or even (2, 4, 6, or 8) . A plus sign served as a fixation point, and S1 appeared 0.5 cm to the left of fixation and S2 appeared 0.5 cm to the right of fixation. R1 was made by pressing the Z or X key, on the bottom row of the keyboard, with left-middle and left-index fingers, respectively. R2 was made by pressing the N or M key, also on the bottom row, with the right-index and rightmiddle fingers, respectively. The leftmost response of each pair was used for even and consonant classifications and the rightmost response for odd and vowel classifications (see Figure 2) .
Procedure. Participants performed a pair of tasks on each trial. Four different pairs of tasks were manipulated within blocks of trials: DD, DL, LL, and LD. The SOAs of 50, 150, 300, and 800 ms between the onsets of the left and right stimuli (S1 and S2, respectively) were varied between blocks of trials. Each participant was assigned to one of eight different orders in which to receive the SOAs. Across the eight orders, each SOA occurred equally often in each position of the sequence. Each block contained 48 trials, 12 for each of the four task pairs.
Participants were told that they would be performing two tasks on each trial in the regular experimental blocks but that they would begin with a series of practice trials. Fifty trials of practice were administered first, 10 for each task alone with each hand, followed by 10 dual-task trials. Prior to the dual-task practice, participants were instructed to respond to the tasks in the same order as they were presented. They were also told to rest their index and middle fingers of each hand on response keys throughout the whole block to maximize their performance in speed and accuracy. These instructions were repeated prior to the experimental blocks. The four experimental blocks were then presented, with participants encouraged to take a brief break between successive blocks.
Every trial within a block was preceded by an instruction, "press the space bar to continue." After the space bar was pressed, there was a 100-ms pause, followed by the fixation point. Eight hundred ms after the onset of the fixation point, S1 was displayed on the left side of the fixation point for 250 ms. S2 appeared after the appropriate SOA and was displayed on the right side of the fixation point for 250 ms. The fixation point disappeared at the offset of S2, and the screen remained blank until both responses were made. If both responses were correct, the "continue" message appeared immediately on the screen. If one or both responses were incorrect, feedback displayed in the center of the screen indicated which response was incorrect. This feedback was displayed for 1,500 ms, and then the continue message appeared.
Results
Only correct trials with both RT1 and RT2 greater than 100 ms and less than 2,000 ms were included in the data to be analyzed. To examine correspondence effects in an appropriate way, trials having an incorrect order of responses (e.g., R1 made after R2) or for which the responses were made with an interresponse interval (IRI) less than 150 ms were excluded. A total of 6% of the trials were omitted in this data analysis. The results in the reported data analyses were similar to the results when all data were included.
Separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed using RT and proportion of error (PE; PE1 for T1 and PE2 for T2) as the dependent variables. The independent variables were SOA (50, 150, 300, or 800 ms), task transition (repeat or switch), spatial correspondence between the locations of R1 and R2 (correspondence or noncorrespondence), and participants, with the last variable considered a random factor. Although the digit task and the letter task require different operations and have different RTs and PEs, the effect of task type in T1 and T2 was not the major concern of this study. Consequently, the type of task classification was not included as a factor in the overall data analyses. Significant interactions between task transition and correspondence were followed up with analyses of simple main effects to clarify the relations. In such situations, Maxwell and Delany (1990, p. 265 ) recommended a Bonferroni correction for the number of tests of each main effect, to keep the familywise alpha level at .05 for each main effect. There are two tests of each simple main effect, so simple main effects are tested at, for example, alpha of .05/2 ϭ .025. Rejection of only one hypothesis in our study was affected by this correction, that is, only one p value fell between .025 and .05.
Task 1 RT and PE. RT1 data are shown in Figure 3 and PE1 in Table 1 . For RT1, no effect was found to be significant. For PE1, the main effect of SOA was significant, F(3, 47) ϭ 2.77, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0083; PE1 was .07, .05, .04, and .06 at the 50-, 150-, 300-, and 800-ms SOAs, respectively. The main effect of task transition was also significant, F(1, 47) ϭ 98.29, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0029. The PE1 was .03 higher in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. Task transition interacted with SOA, F(3, 47) ϭ 2.75, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0041. The switch cost was .04, .03, .06, and .06 at the 50-, 150-, 300-, and 800-ms SOAs, respectively.
There was a main effect of correspondence in PE1, F(1, 47) ϭ 76.38, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0050. Participants were more error prone when R1 did not correspond with R2 than when it did. Correspondence interacted significantly with task transition, F(1, 47) ϭ 47.86, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0070. To follow up the significant Correspondence ϫ Task Transition interaction, four separate ANOVAs were used to test for simple main effects of task switch (a) when there was correspondence and (b) when there was not, and simple main effects of correspondence (c) when there was a task switch and (d) when there was not. In the switch condition, correspondence significantly reduced error rates, F(1, 47) ϭ 81.52, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0088; PE1 was .12 in the noncorrespondence condition and .03 in the correspondence condition. The effect of correspondence was not significant in the repeat condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 0.33. Error rates were significantly higher in the switch condition than in the repeat condition when there was no response correspondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 111.85, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0056. When the locations of R1 and R2 did not correspond, the PE1 was .12 in the switch condition and .04 in the repeat condition. The effect was not significant in the correspondence condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 0.53.
Task 2 RT and PE. The RT2 data are shown in Figure 4 and PE2 in Table 2 . For RT2, there were main effects of SOA, F(3, 141) ϭ 42.97, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 93,689, and correspondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 12.24, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 23,539. RT2 was considerably longer at short SOAs, indicating that a sizable PRP effect was found (RT2 was 1,223; 1,094; 999; and 881 ms for SOAs of 50, 150, 300, and 800 ms, respectively). RT2 was 39 ms slower when the location for R2 did not correspond with that for R1 than when it did. The interaction of SOA and correspondence was not significant, F(3, 141) ϭ 2.66, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 11,379.
The main effect of task transition was significant, F(1, 47) ϭ 16.77, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 29,077; RT2 was 50 ms longer in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. Task transition did not enter into a two-way interaction with correspondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 2.53, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 13,240, or a two-way interaction with SOA, F(3, 141) ϭ 1.37, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 14,284. The three-way interaction of task transition, correspondence, and SOA was not significant, F(3, 141) ϭ 0.41, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 15,969.
The PE2 data showed only a main effect of correspondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 9.92, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0079. PE2 was .05 when the response locations corresponded and was .07 when they did not.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, a correspondence effect between T1 and T2 was obtained for RT2, regardless of whether T2 was repeated or switched from T1. That is, responses on T2 were faster when responses for T1 and T2 corresponded than when they did not in both the repeat and switch conditions. Thus, there was no reverse correspondence effect, contrary to the hypothesis that response correspondence effects in dual tasks have the same form as response repetition effects in single tasks (e.g., Roger & Monsell, 1995) .
The error rates on T1 indicate that something unusual occurred when the tasks switched and the responses did not correspond. In that case, the error rates were unusually high. There is a possibility that the correspondence effects in the switch condition resulted from response bias. Perhaps when there was no foreknowledge of task transition and task identity, participants were biased to make pairs of responses that corresponded in the condition where T2 was different from T1. An example of such a pair is Ͻleft, leftϾ, in which R1 is made with the left key of the left-hand set and R2 with the left key of the right-hand set. If there were such a response bias, R1 that corresponded with R2 would be made more frequently than R1 that did not. This would explain fewer errors on T1 when the responses ought to correspond, at the cost of more errors when the responses ought not to correspond. In this experiment, participants had no foreknowledge of task transition and task identity on T1 and T2. Advance preparation or reconfiguration (prior to the onset of S1) was not possible. Results showed RT1 to be approximately the same regardless of whether T1 was the same as or different from T2. The absence of an interaction of SOA and task transition was observed for T2; that is, the switch cost on T2 was approximately the same across SOAs. As suggested by Rogers and Monsell (1995) , as well as Logan and Gordon's (2001) quantitative model, reconfiguration of a new task set is needed when the task switches but not when it repeats. In the modified central bottleneck model illustrated in Figure 5 , the additivity of SOA and task transition can be explained by locating the task-set reconfiguration (TSR) on T2, which is needed for a task switch but not for a task repeat, after central processing for T1 has been completed (as shown in the box labeled TSR for the task-switch condition).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, participants were unaware whether T1 or T2 would be the same or different and what the particular tasks would be. Consequently, participants were not able to prepare to switch tasks until the presentation of S2. De Jong (1995) argued that in the PRP paradigm, participants not only prepare for T1 but also prepare the subsequent switch to T2 prior to each trial. In Experiment 2, we provided foreknowledge of task transition. This was accomplished by using a PRP task similar to that of Experiment 1 but with task transition blocked. Consequently, participants knew for each block whether T2 would be the same as T1. Because there was certainty about whether the same or different tasks would be presented for T1 and T2, participants could prepare to switch after S1 in the switch condition. Also, it is likely that the high error rate for the noncorrespondence trials in the switch condition would not appear because the participants know that T2 is going to be different from T1; the foreknowledge of switch or repeat tasks should prevent response bias from occurring. Figure 5 . A modified central bottleneck model for the conditions in which Task 2 (T2) is switched from Task 1 (T1). In this model, the central processing stage (the shaded boxes) involves response activation (B1 i and B2 i ) and intentional response selection (B1 j and B2 j ), with the bottleneck located at the intentional response-selection stage. The crosstalk between T1 and T2 takes place at the response activation stage, which is operating by the automatic control. The task-set reconfiguration (TSR) for T2 is triggered when tasks switched, which takes place after the central processing of T1. This reconfiguration is operating by the executive control. In contrast, the TSR is not needed when T2 is repeated from T1. A1, B1 (i and j) , and C1 are, respectively, early peripheral, central, and late peripheral processing of T1. A2, B2 (i and j) , and C2 are corresponding processes for T2. S1 ϭ stimulus for T1; S2 ϭ stimulus for T2; R1 ϭ response for T1; R2 ϭ response for T2; SOA ϭ stimulus onset asynchrony.
Method
Participants. There were 48 participants in this experiment. They were students from the same participant pool as in the previous experiment, but none had participated in that experiment.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The major change from Experiment 1 was that the trials were blocked by task transition (switch or repeat). In the switch blocks, dual tasks of the form DL and LD occurred randomly within the blocks. Similarly, in the repeat blocks, dual tasks of the form DD and LL occurred randomly within the blocks. There were eight blocks of 56 experimental trials. The trials were ordered for a given participant such that he or she received all four SOAs for one task transition condition before receiving the other task transition condition. There were four orders of the four SOAs and two orders of the task transition conditions. Prior to the four blocks for the first task condition, 30 practice trials were given, 5 for each task alone with each hand and 10 dual-task trials for that particular task condition. Prior to the four blocks of the second task condition, participants were given 10 dual-task practice trials for that particular task condition. In other respects, the method was the same as that of Experiment 1.
Results
Similar to Experiment 1, only correct trials with (a) both RT1 and RT2 greater than 100 ms and less than 2,000 ms and (b) correct response order with minimal 150-ms IRI were included in the data to be analyzed. Seventeen percent of the trials were omitted in these data analyses. The results found in the reported data analyses were similar to those obtained when all data were included.
Task 1 RT and PE. RT1 data are shown in Figure 3 and PE1 in Table 1 . For RT1, the main effect of correspondence was significant, F(1, 47) ϭ 26.21, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 10,744; RT1 was 39 ms shorter when there was correspondence than when there was not. There was a significant interaction between correspondence and SOA, F(3, 141) ϭ 3.37, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 6,741. The spatial correspondence effect decreased as SOA increased (the effect was 57, 47, 41, and 7 ms for the SOAs of 50, 150, 300, and 800 ms, respectively).
There was a significant main effect of task transition, F(1, 47) ϭ 6.97, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 121,506, with RT1 being 67 ms shorter in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. Task transition interacted with correspondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 7.79, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 8,060. In the follow-up analyses of simple main effects, there was a significant correspondence effect in the switch condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 5.01, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 7,834, and in the repeat condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 27.83, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 10,970. The correspondence effect was only 21 ms in the switch condition but was 56 ms in the repeat condition. When response locations did not correspond, a significant reverse task-switching effect was obtained, F(1, 47) ϭ 10.68, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 64,148, with RT1 being 84 ms faster in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. However, the taskswitching effect was not significant when the response locations corresponded, F(1, 47) ϭ 3.43, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 65,417, with RT1 being only 49 ms faster in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. No effects were found to be significant for the PE1 data.
Task 2 RT and PE. The RT2 data are shown in Figure 4 and PE2 in Table 2 . There was a main effect of SOA, F(3, 141) ϭ 110.78, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 25,990; RT2 decreased when SOA increased (RT2 was 1,222, 1,189, 1,066, and 954 ms for 50-, 150-, 300-, and 800-ms SOAs, respectively). The main effect of correspondence was also significant, F(1, 47) ϭ 89.54, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 7,488, with RT2 being 59 ms slower when the response location for T2 did not correspond with that for T1 than when it did. There was a significant interaction between correspondence and SOA, F(3, 141) ϭ 4.29, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 4,966. The correspondence effects decreased as SOA increased (85, 55, 61, and 35 ms for 50-, 150-, 300-, and 800-ms SOAs, respectively).
There was no main effect of task transition, F(1, 47) ϭ 0.49, but the interaction of task transition and correspondence was significant, F(1, 47) ϭ 13.05, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 5,950. In the follow-up analyses, there was a simple main effect of correspondence on RT2, both in the switch condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 19.95, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 7,313, and in the repeat condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 98.33, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 6,124. The correspondence effect in RT2 was 39 ms in the switch condition and 79 ms in the repeat condition. The simple main effect of task transition was not significant both when there was correspondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 2.12, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 60,530, and when there was not, F(1, 47) ϭ 0.03, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 51,895. Task transition did not interact with SOA, nor did it enter into a three-way interaction with SOA and correspondence, Fs(3, 141) Յ 1.60, ps Ͼ .05, MSEs Յ 18,396.
The PE2 data showed a significant main effect of correspondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 12.36, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 0.01003. Participants committed fewer errors when the location for R2 corresponded with that for R1 (PE2 ϭ .07) than when it did not (PE2 ϭ .10). The interaction of correspondence and SOA was significant as well, F(3, 141) ϭ 4.76, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0036. The correspondence effect decreased as SOA increased (the effect was .05, .02, .03, and 0 for 50-, 150-, 300-, and 800-ms SOAs, respectively). Similar to the RT2 data, the interaction of task transition and correspondence was significant, F(1, 47) ϭ 16.40, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0046. In the follow-up analyses, there was a significant simple main effect of correspondence in the repeat condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 25.07, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0079, but not in the switch condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 0.43, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0068. The correspondence effect was .04 when the tasks were repeated but only .01 when the tasks switched. Moreover, there was a significant simple main effect of task transition when there was correspondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 8.19, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0073, with the PE being .02 higher in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. In contrast, the task transition was not significant when there was noncorrespondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 2.51, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0084.
Discussion
As in Experiment 1, no interaction of SOA and task transition on RT2 was found, suggesting that task-set reconfiguration on the switch tasks cannot begin until central processing of T1 is completed. The abnormally high error rate on T1 for the noncorrespondence trials in the switch condition in Experiment 1 was not evident in Experiment 2. Thus, giving participants the foreknowledge of task transition prevented what may have been a response bias in Experiment 1 to make R1 that spatially corresponded to R2.
One unusual finding in Experiment 2 is that RT1 was shorter on trials for which the task switched from T1 to T2 than on trials for which it repeated. The apparent reason for this repetition cost, or switch benefit, is that grouping of responses occurred on a much larger percentage of trials when T2 was the same as T1 compared with when it was different. Figure 6 shows the frequency distributions for the interresponse interval, where IRI ϭ RT2 -RT1 ϩ SOA, as a function of SOA. The distributions are unimodal at the 50-ms SOA, becoming increasingly bimodal as SOA increases, with the two modes most pronounced at the 800-ms SOA. The first mode (apparent at all SOAs) reflects trials for which the IRI was short, whereas the second mode reflects trials for which R2 followed R1 by an interval approximating the SOA. The important point to note is that the first mode is considerably higher for the repeat condition than for the switch condition at all SOAs, including the 800-ms SOA, indicating that the two responses were grouped more when the task was the same for T1 and T2. This difference was not evident in similar IRI distribution functions plotted for Experiment 1, implying that the grouping depends on participants knowing that the task will be repeated. In other words, when participants knew that T2 would be the same as T1, they tended to wait to respond until responses were selected for both T1 and T2, executing the responses in close temporal proximity. This grouping strategy likely was adopted to minimize the possibility that the response intended for T2 would be made for T1, and vice versa.
This strategy of grouping responses on task-repetition trials is likely responsible for the absence of a task-switch cost on RT2. Because R2 was emitted after R1, if R1 was withheld until R2 was selected, R2 would be delayed until R1 was executed. Because the IRI distribution for the 800-ms SOA had two distinct modes, corresponding to grouped and ungrouped responses, we partitioned it into trials with IRI less than 600 ms and greater than or equal to 600 ms.
2 For the short IRIs, T2 responses were numerically faster on switch trials (M ϭ 985 ms) than on repetition trials (M ϭ 993 ms), F(1, 39) ϭ 0.08, p ϭ .773, whereas for the long IRIs, responses tended to be slower on switch trials (M ϭ 959 ms) than on repetition trials (M ϭ 889 ms), F(1, 37) ϭ 3.81, p ϭ .058. Thus, on trials for which grouping of R1 and R2 did not occur, the task-switch cost was evident. A similar analysis for the other SOAs could not be performed due to the closer temporal proximity of S1 and S2. However, the fact that the short-IRI mode was also much higher for task-repetition trials than for task-switch trials at these SOAs suggests that the mean RTs for them also reflect mixtures of trials for which there was no response grouping, and a switch cost, with trials for which the responses were grouped (more so on task-repetition trials than on task-switch trials).
The significant interaction of correspondence and SOA on RT1 and RT2 suggests that there may be some crosstalk when the 2 There were 8 participants who had no trials with IRI less than 600 ms, whereas 10 participants had no trials with IRI greater than or equal to 600 ms. Consequently, only data from 40 participants were included in the analyses with IRI less than 600 ms, and data from 38 participants were included in the analyses with IRI greater than or equal to 600 ms. processing of two tasks overlaps temporally. The correspondence effect was in the typical direction for both T1 and T2; that is, responses were faster when R1 and R2 corresponded than when they did not. The benefit of correspondence decreased as SOA increased. The form of the interaction of correspondence and SOA for RT1 and RT2 is in agreement with the results of Experiment 1 and those of Hommel (1998) and Lien and Proctor (2000) . Although the interaction of correspondence and SOA was significant on RT1 and RT2 in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1, the comparison between experiments showed no difference in the correspondence effect across SOAs. These results suggest that the crosstalk correspondence effect depends on the degree of temporal overlap between the processing of two tasks, regardless of whether task transition foreknowledge was given or not.
In the discussion of Experiment 1, we brought up the hypothesis that the effect of correspondence is due to a change in response bias. In this experiment, the correspondence effect was in the ordinary direction (i.e., faster and more accurate responses when the responses correspond). In this experiment, unlike in Experiment 1, there was no evidence of a speed-accuracy trade-off for correspondence effects in T1 or T2. Results in both experiments are consistent with the hypothesis that when responses are likely to correspond spatially, participants are biased to emit corresponding responses.
In Experiment 1, participants did not know prior to the presentation of S2 whether T2 would be the same as T1, or which task either T1 or T2 would be. In Experiment 2, participants knew whether T2 would be the same as T1, but they did not know which specific tasks would be used for T1 and T2 until the presentation of S1. Neither experiment produced a reverse responsecorrespondence effect, as one would expect under the hypothesis that response-correspondence effects in dual-task paradigms have the same form as response-repetition effects in single-task paradigms. The failure to find a reverse response-correspondence effect may be due to lack of foreknowledge of task identity. Although the degree of uncertainty about the tasks was less in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, neither of the procedures used in those experiments was typical for studies of task switching or the PRP effect. In both task-switching and PRP studies, the participant usually knows exactly what task will occur next. Therefore, Experiment 3 used a procedure in which participants knew not only whether the task would switch from T1 to T2 for the trials within a block but also which particular tasks (digit or letter) would be performed and in what order.
Experiment 3
On the basis of the previous two experiments, we expected to find a cost of task transition. Because the switch condition in Experiment 3 is the standard condition used in most studies reporting PRP effects, we expected to obtain a substantial PRP effect here as well. Kleinsorge and Heuer (1999) have suggested that when task sets for T1 and T2 are known they can be prepared simultaneously. Accordingly, one could argue that when participants have specific information about a forthcoming task switch, they can reconfigure or change parameters for T2 during peripheral or central processing of T1. De Jong (1995) took a contrary position, arguing that people have a "fundamental inability to maintain proper preparation for two independent, discrete tasks at the same time" (p. 21). This implies that participants cannot reconfigure or change parameters for T2 until central processing for T1 is completed, even when they have complete foreknowledge of T1 and T2. These two proposals lead to different possibilities for the location of TSR in Figure 5 . It is possible that (a) all of TSR takes place in the foreperiod before S1, but we pursue this no further because in that case there would be no effect of task transition on RT1 or RT2. Another possibility is that (b) TSR occurs somewhere after S1 and before or during B1 j , finishing before the end of B1 j . This is possible according to the proposal of Kleinsorge and Heuer (1999) . In that case, one would expect that at short SOAs there would be an effect of task transition on RT2. But at long SOAs the lower path from S2 to R2 would be the longest path, and there would be little or no effect of task transition on RT2. Thus, there would be an interaction between SOA and task transition.
A third possibility is that (c) TSR occurs after B1 j but before B2 j , as illustrated in Figure 5 . This follows the proposal of De Jong (1995) . In that case, at long SOAs there would be an effect of task transition on RT2. However, at short SOAs, there might not be an effect of task transition on RT2, because of the path from R1 to R2 indicated by a dashed arrow. There might be an interaction but of the opposite form as expected for case (b). Another possible outcome for case (c) is additivity between SOA and task transition. In the event that additivity is found, we cannot rule out the possibility that task transition has effects at both the locations described in possibilities (b) and (c), with the two interactions of different forms canceling each other, leading to approximately additive effects. However in that case, some part of the effect of task transition occurs as illustrated in Figure 5 . In short, additive effects of SOA and task transition support the conclusion that some or all of the effect of task transition occurs after the central processing of T1 is finished, as illustrated in Figure 5 .
The correspondence effects evident in Experiments 1 and 2 could be due to at least two sources, response-response (R-R) associations or stimulus-response (S-R) associations. An R-R association account assumes that activation of a response for one task produces activation of the spatially corresponding response for the other task. Kantowitz (1974) , for example, proposed that conflicting response tendencies prolong motoric response preparation. An equivalent effect would be produced by response activation, so that if the left response is activated for one task, this response activation also produces some activation of the left response for the other task. An S-R association account assumes that the stimulus for one task activates not only its assigned response code but also, to a lesser extent, the corresponding response code for the other task. In our experiments, the stimulus for T1 was presumed to be irrelevant to T2 and the stimulus for T2 was presumed to be irrelevant to T1. However, the digit and letter tasks in the present study were used for both T1 and T2. Consequently, the stimulus for one task might activate a response code for the appropriate task as well as for the inappropriate task. For example, when a consonant is assigned to the left response and is presented for T1, it will activate the left keypress for T1 and might also activate the left keypress for T2. This S-R association model is supported by the vast literature on single-task studies of irrelevant stimulus information, such as the Stroop color naming task (MacLeod, 1991), the Simon task (Lu & Proctor, 1995) , the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) , and task switching (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995) . Experiment 3, in which participants were given specific information about T1 and T2 for each block, provides an opportunity to test the R-R and S-R association accounts. In this experiment, not only did participants know whether the two tasks would switch or repeat, but they also knew what the task identity would be for each task. If R-R associations are the primary source of the correspondence effect, there is no obvious reason for the correspondence effect to be different for the repeat and switch conditions. In contrast, if S-R associations are the primary source, the correspondence effect could be smaller in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. That is because in the switch condition participants know specifically which stimuli are assigned to T1 (e.g., digits) and which stimuli are assigned to T2 (e.g., letters). Thus, the stimuli for T1 might activate response codes for T1 but not for T2. However, in the repeat condition, the same stimuli are used for T1 and T2. Thus, the stimuli for T1 might activate response codes for T2 and vice versa. As a result, one might expect to observe a much smaller correspondence effect in the switch condition than in the repeat condition.
Method
Participants. There were 48 participants in this experiment. They were students from the same participant pool as in the previous two experiments, but none had participated in those experiments.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The major change from Experiments 1 and 2 was that the trials were blocked by task pair; that is, dual-task trials of the form DD, DL, LD, and LL were presented in separate blocks. There were 16 blocks of 21 trials. The blocks were ordered so that a given participant received all four SOAs for one task pair before switching to another task pair. Prior to the four blocks for a task pair, 15 practice trials were given, 5 for T1, 5 for T2, and 5 for their combination. In other respects, the method was the same as that of Experiments 1 and 2.
Results
As in the previous two experiments, only correct trials with (a) both RT1 and RT2 greater than 100 ms and less than 2,000 ms and (b) correct response order with minimal 150-ms IRI were included in the data to be analyzed. There were 7% of the trials omitted in the reported data analyses. The results found in the reported data analyses were similar to those obtained when all data were included.
Task 1 RT and PE. The RT1 data are shown in Figure 3 and PE2 in Table 1 . For RT1, only the interaction between task transition and SOA was significant, F(3, 141) ϭ 2.97, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 15,718. At the shortest and longest SOAs, RT1 was slower in the switch condition than in the repeat condition (the differences were 15 ms and 35 ms at the 50-and 800-ms SOAs, respectively). In contrast, RT1 was faster in the switch condition than in the repeat condition at the two intermediate SOAs (the differences were 9 ms and 36 ms at the 150-and 300-ms SOAs, respectively).
In the PE1 data, the main effect of correspondence was significant, F(1, 47) ϭ 15.36, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0027, as well as its interaction with SOA, F(3, 141) ϭ 3.38, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0014. The error rate on T1 was .02 higher when the response location for T1 did not correspond with that for T2 (PE1 ϭ .04) than when it did (PE1 ϭ .02). The correspondence effect on PE1 was .02, .01, .01, and .02 at the 50-, 150-, 300-, and 800-ms SOAs, respectively. No other effects were significant.
Task 2 RT and PE. The RT2 data are shown in Figure 4 and PE2 data in Table 2 . For RT2, there were significant main effects of SOA, F(3, 141) ϭ 103.28, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 18,284, and of task transition, F(1, 47) ϭ 17.66, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 19,628. RT2 decreased when SOA increased (RT2s were 922, 861, 788, and 692 ms for 50-, 150-, 300-, and 800-ms SOAs, respectively). RT2 was 42 ms slower in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. Neither the interaction of SOA and task transition, F(3, 141) ϭ 1.47, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 9,703, nor their interaction with correspondence was significant, F(3, 141) Ͻ 1.00. The interaction of SOA and correspondence was not significant, F(3, 141) ϭ 1.05, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 9,161.
There was a significant main effect of correspondence on RT2, F(1, 47) ϭ 7.52, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 8,834, with RT2 being 18 ms slower when response locations of T1 and T2 did not correspond than when they did. The two-way interaction of correspondence and task transition was significant, F(1, 47) ϭ 15.15, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 7,875. In the follow-up analyses, in the switch condition, there was no simple main effect of correspondence (numerically, the correspondence effect was Ϫ6 ms). However, there was a significant simple main effect of correspondence in the repeat condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 15.65, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 11,620, with RT2 being 43 ms faster when the response locations corresponded than when they did not. There was a significant simple main effect of task transition when the response locations correspond, F(1, 47) ϭ 26.01, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 16,777, but not when the response locations did not correspond, F(1, 47) ϭ 2.76, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 10,726. Numerically, there was a switch cost of 67 ms in the correspondence condition but only 18 ms in the noncorrespondence condition.
For PE2, there were main effects of SOA, F(3, 141) ϭ 3.78, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0041, and correspondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 21.03, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0102. The PE2 was .07, .06, .07, and .05 at the 50-, 150-, 300-, and 800-ms SOAs, respectively. The PE2 was .04 smaller when locations of R1 and R2 corresponded than when they did not. The two-way interaction of correspondence and task transition was significant as well, F(1, 47) ϭ 39.44, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0039. In the follow-up analyses, there was no simple main effect of correspondence in the switch condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 0.48, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0056. In contrast, there was a significant simple main effect of correspondence in the repeat condition, F(1, 47) ϭ 42.88, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0085. In that case, PE2 increased from .03 when there was correspondence to .09 when there was noncorrespondence. There was a significant task-switching effect both when there was correspondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 13.62, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0038, and when there was noncorrespondence, F(1, 47) ϭ 16.16, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 0.0065. There was a switch effect of .03 in the correspondence condition, but it was Ϫ.03 (a reverse switch effect) in the noncorrespondence condition.
There was a significant three-way interaction between SOA, correspondence, and task transition, F(3, 141) ϭ 3.01, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 0.0036. This interaction reflects the fact that the correspondence effect decreased as SOA increased in the repeat condition (the effect was .11, .06, .04, and .05 for the 50-, 150-, 300-, and 800-ms SOAs, respectively) but showed only a slight change at the longest SOA in the switch condition (the effect was .01, .01, .01, and Ϫ.01 for the 50-, 150-, 300-, and 800-ms SOAs, respectively).
Discussion
As in the previous two experiments, RT2 showed a substantial PRP effect and no interaction of task transition and SOA. Thus, even with full foreknowledge of T1 and T2, there was no evidence that the switch to T2 could precede before or during central processing of T1 (i.e., prior to the central bottleneck). This finding supports De Jong's (1995) argument that central processing is allocated to the two tasks sequentially, with the switch to T2 taking place after the completion of T1 central processing. Moreover, because a PRP effect occurred on trials with task repetition in Experiment 3, as well as in Experiments 1 and 2, these results confirm Pashler's (1994) claim that the central bottleneck is not caused by the need to switch tasks. In fact, the size of the PRP effect was approximately the same in the repeat and switch conditions.
In this experiment, unlike Experiment 2, RT1 was not slower on repeat trials than on switch trials. Moreover, the IRI frequency distributions (see Figure 7) showed much less indication of a tendency to group R1 and R2 more on the repeat trials than on the switch trials. The IRI distributions shifted from unimodal to bimodal as SOA increased, as in Experiment 2, but the pronounced differences in magnitude of the peak for the first mode on taskrepetition and switch trials were not evident. Thus, knowledge about what task to perform for T1 and T2 apparently allows participants to prepare to perform T1 and T2 in a way that does not necessitate more grouping of responses when the two tasks are the same than when they are different.
As described in the introduction of Experiment 3, giving participants full foreknowledge of T1 and T2 allows us to test the R-R and S-R association accounts for correspondence effects. In this experiment, the correspondence effect was small and nonsignificant in the switch condition but large and significant in the repeat condition for both RTs and PEs in T1 and T2. The absence of a correspondence effect in the switch condition argues against the hypothesis that the source of the correspondence effect is in competing response tendencies (Kantowitz, 1974) . If it were, the correspondence effect should occur even when the two tasks are different because the relationship among the responses is the same as when the two tasks are the same. If the correspondence effect occurs because of the need to prepare two responses simultaneously, it must do so in a complicated way. In contrast, the absence of the correspondence effect in the switch condition is in agreement with the hypothesis that correspondence effects are due to S-R associations, where the stimulus for one task activates the response for the other task. It appears that when participants know what the two specific tasks will be for T1 and T2, they can isolate the processing for each task. Consequently, the stimulus for one Figure 7 . The IRI frequency distributions for each stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) in Experiment 3. In these IRI distribution functions, only the trials with IRIs greater than 150 ms and less than 1,500 ms are included. The bin size was 50 ms. task produces little or no activation of the responses for the other task.
General Discussion
In the present study, digit and letter tasks with manual responses (left vs. right key) were used for T1 and T2. Foreknowledge of task transition (switch or repeat from T1 to T2) and task identity (the digit or letter tasks) was varied across experiments. In Experiment 1, participants had no foreknowledge of task transition and task identity for the upcoming trial. In Experiment 2, participants had partial foreknowledge of tasks: They knew whether the tasks would be switched or repeated but not what the specific tasks would be. In Experiment 3, full foreknowledge of task transition and task identity was given prior to each block of trials: Participants knew what tasks they had to perform and whether the tasks would repeat or switch. Table 3 summarizes the significant main effects and interactions of task transition, correspondence, and SOA across these experiments.
Examination of the PRP effect across experiments shows that it was largest when there was no foreknowledge of task transition and task identity (Experiment 1: the PRP effect was 349 ms and 334 ms for the switch and repeat conditions, respectively), intermediate when there was foreknowledge of task transition only (Experiment 2: the effect was 272 ms and 264 ms for the switch and repeat conditions, respectively), and smallest when there was full foreknowledge of task transition and task identity (Experiment 3: the effect was 227 ms and 234 ms for the switch and repeat conditions, respectively). However, the PRP effect was additive with task transition for all experiments. In other words, the slowing on RT2 at the short SOA relative to the long SOA was of similar magnitude for both switch and repeat conditions, regardless of whether participants had complete, partial, or no foreknowledge about task transition and task identity. The additivity between task transition and SOA suggests that the task-set reconfiguration for T2, presumed to be needed in the switch condition but not the repeat condition, takes place after the central processing of T1 (see Figure 5) .
Comparison of the three experiments showed an overall correspondence effect, F(1, 141) ϭ 65.29, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 13,387, that interacted with SOA, F(6, 423) ϭ 4.55, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 8,502. In other words, confirming previous PRP findings, the correspondence effect on RT2 was larger at the short SOA than at the long SOA. This interaction of correspondence and SOA did not differ significantly across the three experiments, F(6, 423) ϭ 1.33, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 8,502. The correspondence effect found on RT2 might simply be due to crosstalk going in one direction, from T2 to T1. In Figure 5 , this would be crosstalk only from B2 i to B1 i (see, e.g., Hommel, 1998) . In the diagram shown in Figure 5 , any delay in the end of B1 j will delay R1 and R2 by the same amount (assuming no grouping). Thus, the correspondence effect on RT2 would be only the carry over effect from RT1, producing an equal crosstalk effect on each task.
Alternatively, the correspondence effect on RT2 could be due to crosstalk going in both directions, from T1 to T2 and from T2 to T1 (e.g., Hommel & Eglau, 2002) . In this case, a larger correspondence effect should be found in RT2 than in RT1. To evaluate these two possibilities, we conducted an ANOVA including response (R1 and R2) on RT1 and RT2. 3 The data from the shortest 50-ms SOA are the most appropriate for this evaluation because that SOA has the most temporal overlap between the processing of T1 and T2 and the largest correspondence effect. Results showed that the interaction of correspondence and response was significant for all three experiments, each F(1, 47) Ն 6.13, p Ͻ .05, and MSE Յ 3,364, reflecting a larger correspondence effect on RT2 than RT1. These findings suggest that the correspondence effect on RT2 is not simply due to the propagation of the correspondence effect from RT1. Instead, the correspondence effect from T1 also directly affects the duration of T2 processing.
The relation between correspondence and task transition for RT2 is noteworthy: The correspondence effect was larger when T1 and T2 were the same task than when they were not, or, alternatively, the task-switch effect was larger when there was correspondence than when there was not (see also Rogers & Monsell's, 1995 , findings of the congruency effect for repeat and switch tasks in single-task performance). When the foreknowledge changed from none (Experiment 1) to partial (Experiment 2), the correspondence effect was at least as large in Experiment 2 as in 
Note. Check marks indicate F ratios significant at p Ͻ .05. RT1 ϭ response time for Task 1; PE1 ϭ proportion of errors for Task 1; RT2 ϭ response time for Task 2; PE2 ϭ proportion of errors for Task 2.
Experiment 1 in the repeat condition and was about the same magnitude in the switch condition. For RT1, the switch conditions yielded faster responses than the repeat condition, when there was either correspondence or noncorrespondence. For RT2, the repeat condition yielded faster responses than the switch condition when there was correspondence but showed no difference when there was noncorrespondence. On the other hand, when the foreknowledge changed from none (Experiment 1) or partial (Experiment 2) to full (Experiment 3), the correspondence effect observed on RT1 and RT2 for the switch condition in both Experiments 1 and 2 was not evident in Experiment 3. The relations between task transition and response correspondence complicate accounts of task switching. For example, De Jong (2000) proposed an intention-activation model, which attributes switch costs to the failure to engage in advance preparation. According to this model, participants are completely prepared for upcoming tasks on some trials and completely unprepared on others. Hence, mean RTs arise from a mixture of prepared and unprepared states. The model accounts well for RT distributions discussed by De Jong and by Nieuwenhuis and Monsell (2002) . However, it is not clear from De Jong's model, as well as traditional task-switching accounts (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) , why the switch to T2 cannot proceed in parallel with central processing of T1 (i.e., why it is subject to the central bottleneck). In general, these existing task-switching theories do not provide a complete account of the task-switching phenomena observed in our PRP studies. It appears that some modification is needed to account for interactions of task-switching and correspondence effects that were obtained in the present PRP experiments.
Executive Control Versus Automatic Control
A study by Sohn and Carlson (2000) suggested that there are at least two mechanisms operating independently in task switching. One mechanism is goal directed, under intentional executive control, and is primarily affected by the task foreknowledge. The other mechanism is stimulus driven, under involuntary automatic control, and is primarily affected by the task transition (see Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston, 2001 , for a similar argument). The additivity of the switch effect and SOA in the present experiments could be explained in terms of Sohn and Carlson's executive control mechanism operating as in Figure 5 , reconfiguring for T2. However, the magnitude of the PRP effect was modulated by foreknowledge of the task sets. For both switch and repeat conditions, the PRP effect was largest when there was no foreknowledge of task sets, intermediate when there was partial foreknowledge (task transition only), and smallest when there was full foreknowledge (task transition and task identity). These results suggest that the PRP effect is influenced by the preparation for overlappingtask performance. As suggested by Sohn and Carlson, such preparation is carried out by the executive control mechanism, which can prepare the processing system not only for immediate performance of T1 but also for a rapid and properly timed switch to T2 (see also De Jong, 1995) . Because T1 can be prepared in advance, RT1 should be relatively fast and slack time should be less for T2. Consequently, a smaller PRP effect would be obtained, which is evident in the present study when more foreknowledge of task sets was given from Experiment 1 to Experiment 3.
All experiments showed evidence that participants used a strategy of grouping responses for T1 and T2 on some trials, as evidenced by the fact that the IRI distributions showed a mode at short IRIs for all SOAs. Unlike the PRP effect, which decreased systematically across Experiments 1-3, only in Experiment 2 was response grouping more evident for trials on which the task repeated than for trials on which it switched. This condition is characterized by knowing that the task will be the same on T1 and T2 but not what the task will be, suggesting that response grouping may be adopted as a strategy in this condition to prevent too many trials on which R2 is emitted prior to R1.
The task-switch cost customarily observed in the previous literature has been attributed to exogenous preparation as well as to endogenous task reconfiguration. The exogenous preparation component of the task-switching effect is also usually considered to involve the suppression of the previous S-R mapping (e.g., Goschke, 2000) . As characterized by Gopher, Armony, and Greenshpan (2000) , the common feature of the interpretations of the exogenous component provided by Allport et al. (1994) , Rogers and Monsell (1995) , and Meiran (1996) is "the automatic, involuntary, and reactive nature attributed to this cost component" (p. 335). If the term automatic includes the assumption that the exogenous component of task switching takes effect soon after S2 onset (i.e., is not subject to the central bottleneck), then as the SOA between T1 and T2 in the PRP paradigm increases, the switch cost should decrease. This is because some of the switch cost can be absorbed into the slack. Automatic control of this type as a sole source of task-switch costs cannot be reconciled with the additivity of switch cost and SOA obtained in the present experiments.
On the other hand, the automatic control may be responsible for the interaction of correspondence and task switching obtained in the present experiments. In all experiments, the correspondence effect was smaller in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. More specifically, when the participant had full foreknowledge of the specific tasks to perform in Experiment 3, the correspondence effect was eliminated when there was a task switch. This result for dual tasks is analogous to a result for single tasks obtained by Rogers and Monsell (1995, see p. 226) and Meiran (2000b) . They found the usual benefit for response repetition when the task was the same on successive trials; however, when there was a task switch between the two succeeding trials, response repetition either had no effect, or increased RT. In other words, response repetition led to response slowing in the switch condition. Rogers and Monsell suggested that the effect might reflect the inhibition of all active responses carried out from the previous task when the current task is switched from the previous one. Meiran also concluded that the interaction of task transition and response-correspondence effect seems not to be modulated by preparation time; that is, it is not modulated by the foreknowledge of task sets (see also Ruthruff et al., 2001 , for more discussion of response-repetition effects in a single-task context).
In our dual-task paradigm, a different hand was used for each task, so a literal response repetition from T1 to T2 was not possible. However, a series of experiments on single-task performance by Campbell and Proctor (1993) has shown that the benefit observed in repeating the physical response can also be obtained when the S-R mapping across hands preserves relative spatial response location. Therefore, when each response is defined by the S-R mapping, the response codes (e.g., left) are the same for repeating the physical response, which is also the case when response codes for T1 and T2 correspond even though the responses are made by different hands. Taken together, the analog of response repetition is response correspondence; that is, the responses for T1 and T2 are in the same relative spatial locations. Although Rogers and Monsell's (1995) findings, as well as those of Meiran (2000b) , are not directly comparable with ours, our data showed a larger correspondence effect on RT2 for the repeat condition than for the switch condition. In that sense, we obtained a similar pattern as those of Rogers and Monsell and of Meiran. However, we found little evidence of a reverse responsecorrespondence effect in the switch condition of the type that would be expected if response correspondence and response repetition are homologous.
There is a hint in the data that response correspondence may be homologous to response repetition when the tasks are successive. Mean RT2 data showed a small, nonsignificant, F(1, 47) ϭ 2.12, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ 4,905, reverse correspondence effect of 21 ms in the switch condition of Experiment 3 at the 800-ms SOA (see Figure 4 ). This is the only situation in all three experiments in which T1 was generally completed prior to the onset of S2. This finding, if replicable, suggests that the process producing the reverse correspondence effect is one that operates only when the two tasks are successive. Rogers and Monsell (1995) suggested three possible mechanisms that could produce the reversal, one of which involved changes of strength of the associative link between the response and the stimulus category and the other two of which involved inhibition of the response activation or response category for the previous task. These mechanisms were proposed for successive trials in the switch paradigm, and our data suggest that if any of them is a factor in the PRP paradigm, they occur only when T1 is completed prior to the onset of S2.
A Hierarchical Switching Account
To explain phenomena such as reverse response-repetition effects, Heuer (1999, 2001) proposed a hierarchical switching model that uses a key idea from the logical recoding model of Hedge and Marsh (1975) . According to the hierarchical switching model, the participant encodes several dimensions of a task, such as the task to be carried out, the S-R mapping, response repetition, and so on. These dimensions are arranged in a hierarchy, and when the code for some dimension is switched, the codes for all dimensions at lower levels are switched automatically as well. Thus, a reverse response-repetition effect is obtained.
Yet, the hierarchical switching model cannot account for all of the response correspondence and task transition effects found in our data. Applying the hierarchical switching model to our experiments, a code such as (1, 1) is used to represent a trial with the letter task and a response by the finger to the left. Suppose task identity is at a higher level than finger location. Then the code for the letter task precedes the code for the response location. If the subsequent stimulus has the same letter task, but with the other response location, the switch operator S is applied at the lower level, producing the new code (1, S1) ϭ (1, 0). Suppose, instead, that the following trial has the other task, the digit task. Then the switch operator is applied at the higher level, producing the new code S(1, 1) ϭ (0, 0). Note that the new code automatically switches the response location, which may or may not be correct for the following trial. In Heuer's (1999, 2001) model, the stimulus for a task may indicate that some lower level codes have been set incorrectly. In that case, an extra step is taken, to reset the lower level codes to their proper values. This extra step increases the RTs.
In our experiments, consider a dual-task trial LD (a letter task followed by a digit task), with the correct response on T1 made by the finger to the left (on the left hand). The code for T1 is (1, 1) . Because there is a task switch, the code for T2 is S (1, 1) ϭ (0, 0) . If T2 requires a response with the finger to the right (on the right hand), the settings are correct, and the response can be made quickly. But if T2 requires a response with the finger to the left (on the right hand), the finger location code must be reset, and the response is delayed. The consequence is a reverse correspondence effect when there is a task switch. However, the correspondence effect in the switch condition of our three experiments did not show the patterns predicted by the hierarchical switching model. As noted previously, out of the three experiments, only a single SOA (the 800-ms SOA in Experiment 3) showed a reversal of the type predicted by the model.
To recapitulate, the primary evidence that Heuer (1999, 2001 ) provided for their hierarchical switching model came from examination of single-task performance. By applying the hierarchical switching model to our dual-task trials, a reverse response-repetition effect should be obtained in the switch conditions. Yet, our experiments show little evidence of reverse response-correspondence effects, implying that the hierarchical switching model may not be sufficient to explain performance in our dual-task context.
An S-R Association Account
All conditions of the present study, except the switch condition in Experiment 3, showed faster responding for T2 when the locations of R1 and R2 corresponded than when they did not, as in Lien and Proctor's (2000) study. Why then, in the present Experiment 3, would the correspondence effect be absent when participants knew in advance not only that T1 and T2 would be different but also which specific task would be T1 and which T2? Because the switch condition in Experiment 3 had the same left or right keypress responses as all other conditions in the three experiments, the absence of a correspondence effect implies that R-R associations are not solely responsible for the correspondence effects. Heuer's (1999, 2001 ) data suggested that various switching effects obtained in different experimental manipulations can be conceived as effects of involuntary preparation or presetting of a particular S-R mapping. It seems that the stimulus for one task produces some activation of the corresponding response for the other. For example, the appearance of a consonant for T1 activates a left keypress response for T1 and may also produce some activation of the left keypress response for T2 as well.
In the usual task-switching paradigm, participants perform only a single task at a time, and only a single stimulus is displayed (unless extraneous noise stimuli are added, as in Rogers & Monsell's, 1995, study) . However, in the PRP paradigm, participants perform two tasks on each trial, and the stimuli for both tasks are presented in close temporal proximity. In this design, the stimulus for T1 is irrelevant for T2, and vice versa. Therefore, the opportunity exists for S1 to activate responses for T2 and for S2 to activate responses for T1 (see Lien & Proctor, 2002, for a review) . In this way, the relation between stimuli and responses for T1 and T2 is similar to that in single-task situations for which irrelevant stimulus information is presented, such as the Stroop task, the Simon task, and the Eriksen flanker task. In these tasks, the effects of the irrelevant information are attributed to response activation produced by means of long-term S-R associations or temporary S-R associations defined by the task instructions (see Hommel & Eglau, 2002 , for further discussion that long-term S-R associations could be formed even with the task instructions). In our specific experiments, the task arrangement is most like that of the Eriksen flanker task in that the stimulus for one task was flanked by the stimulus for the other task and only the locations of the stimuli determined which stimulus was relevant, and which irrelevant, for T1 and T2. Because the stimuli for both the letter and digit tasks, as well as the categories in which they are to be classified, have no preexisting associations with the keypress responses, the S-R associations are defined by the task instructions.
On the basis of explanations of the Stroop, Simon, and Eriksen effects, it can be assumed that in our experiments presentation of S1 produced response activation not only for T1 but also, to a lesser extent, for T2. Similarly, presentation of S2 produced response activation for both T2 and T1. Consistent with this assumption, Hommel (1998) proposed that response selection in PRP-like tasks consists of two distinct components, response activation and a decision about which response to make on the basis of this activation (see Lien & Proctor, 2002 , for a review). According to Hommel, response activation for both tasks can occur automatically at the same time, with crosstalk between tasks occurring in the manner described above. Correspondence effects on T1, as well as T2, should be largest at short SOAs because the temporal overlap of the activation produced by the two stimuli is greatest at those SOAs. Both Hommel (1998) and Lien and Proctor (2000) obtained results consistent with the predicted temporal pattern of correspondence effects, as did the three experiments in the present study.
In Experiments 1 and 2, the task instructions for all conditions required that participants be prepared to respond to either stimulus set with each hand. Thus, for both the digit and letter classification tasks, temporary associations were defined for the left-hand responses as well as for the right-hand responses. Consequently, regardless of whether S1 and S2 were from the same or different tasks, each stimulus would be likely to activate its associated response for the other task, producing the observed correspondence effects. In Experiment 3, the task instructions specifically indicated which classification task would have to be performed for T1 and T2. In the repeat condition, participants still had to prepare to perform the same classification for both T1 and T2, thus requiring that S-R associations for that task be maintained for both T1 and T2. However, in the switch condition, participants were required to prepare to perform each classification task with only one particular hand, thus making the S-R associations for T1 distinct from those for T2. Because stimuli for T1 had no defined associations with the responses for T2, and the stimuli for T2 had no defined associations with the responses for T1, there was no basis for a correspondence effect to occur.
How is the interaction of correspondence and switching effects obtained in the current three experiments explained by the S-R association account? Figure 8 depicts an S-R association model that is based on the properties described above. In this model, response selection is accomplished with an accumulator and a criterion associated with each possible response. Such accumulator models are very general, in the sense that any given set of RT distributions and response probabilities can always be accounted for with an accumulator model (Dzhafarov, 1997; Marley & Colonius, 1992) . When a stimulus is presented, analyzers determine its attributes, for example whether the stimulus is a vowel or a consonant. Activation is sent continually from analyzers to various accumulators. The amount of activation sent to each accumulator depends on the attributes of the stimulus and the instructions for the task.
One possibility, following Hommel (1998) , is that the activation accumulates at the response-activation stage (B1 i and B2 i in Figure  5 ). This activation goes on concurrently for T1 and T2. Consequently, crosstalk between the response activation processes for T1 and T2 can occur. (Our data are inconclusive about where crosstalk actually occurs.) A criterion is imposed on the activation at the response-selection stage (B1 j and B2 j in Figure 5 ). Imposition of a response criterion occurs for only one task at a time.
In this particular model, we assume the analyzers for vowel and consonant are near neighbors, as are those for odd and even. The analyzers for vowel and consonant are distant from those for odd and even. To implement the instructions for a task, the analyzers for relevant stimulus attributes are connected to the relevant accumulators (see Figure 8) . Thus, for example, for the letter task used in these experiments, the consonant analyzer for S1 is connected to the accumulator for the left response, and the vowel analyzer to the right response, on the left hand. Note, however, that for situations in which the same classification task could be required for T1 or T2, stimulus relevance is defined by a conjunction of the classification analyzer and stimulus location (left of the fixation point for T1), or possibly presentation order. For example, to respond correctly for T1 to a vowel stimulus, the participant must know not only that a vowel has been presented but also that it is in the left location and not the right location.
When a stimulus is presented, activation from classification analyzers is sent to the accumulators connected to them. In most cases, the output of the classification analyzers is not sufficient for restricting the activation to its own response set because the location of the stimulus producing this output must be known. Consequently, the output from the classification analyzers will produce activation in the accumulators for both response sets until the location of the stimulus responsible for the output is determined. Any manipulation that makes it more difficult to resolve which of the stimuli is appropriate for T1 and which for T2 will increase the amount of crosstalk and, hence, the size of the correspondence effect.
How does this model account for the various findings on correspondence and task switching in our experiments when different degrees of foreknowledge on task sets were given? Let us begin with Experiment 3. In the switch condition, participants knew both that there would be a task switch and which classification task would be performed for T1 and which for T2. In this case, there was no association of the classification analyzers appropriate for T1 with the responses for T2 or of the analyzers for T2 with the responses for T1 (see Figures 8C and 8D) . Consequently, each classification analyzer could restrict its activation to its own response set because a conjunction with location was not necessary to know which response set was the appropriate one. Because the activation produced by S1 was not fed into the accumulators for T2, no correspondence effect occurred. In the repeat condition of Experiment 3, participants must have been prepared for only the classification task that would be performed for the trials in the particular trial block. In other words, the analyzers for only one task, either odd-even or vowel-consonant, must have been connected to the responses for both T1 and T2. Because the classification analyzers were associated with the responses for both tasks (see Figures 8A and 8B) , whether the activation produced by a stimulus is relevant to T1 or T2 could be determined only by knowing its location (or presentation order). Consequently, a stimulus for one task produced activation of information in the response-selection accumulators for the other task until its location was identified; this crosstask activation produced a correspondence effect. For Experiment 2, participants did not know in advance on switch trials which classification task would be T1 and which T2. Therefore, associations of letter and digit stimuli to both right-hand and left-hand responses had to be prepared. As a consequence, even though the stimulus for one task is a digit and the other a letter, each stimulus would produce some activation in the response-selection accumulators for the other task until the classification analyzers for each stimulus were conjoined with their locations. Thus, a correspondence effect occurred for the switch condition in Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 3, because the classification analyzers for both tasks were associated with the responses for each hand in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 3. For the repeat trials of Experiment 2, participants knew that the task would be the same for T1 and T2, but they did not know whether it would be letter or digit classification. Therefore, associations of the classification analyzers for both tasks to right-hand and left-hand responses had to be prepared, and a correspondence effect occurred for the same reason as in the switch condition of Experiment 2 and the repeat condition of Experiment 3. The reason why the correspondence effect was larger for the repeat condition than the switch condition in Experiment 2 is likely that two stimuli from the same task category were less distinct than two stimuli from different task categories, making it more difficult to resolve which stimulus was the appropriate for T1 and which for T2. Also, the uncertainty of which task (and specific stimuli) would be presented was larger in Experiment 2, in which either classification task could occur, than in Experiment 3, in which the specific classification task was known. This uncertainty also likely increased the difficulty of determining which stimulus was appropriate for T1 and which for T2, resulting in the larger correspondence effect for repeat trials in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 3.
In Experiment 1, because participants did not have any knowledge of task identity or transition for T1 and T2, they had to be prepared to respond to each task with either hand. Thus, for all trials in Experiment 1, the classification analyzers for both tasks had to be associated with the responses for T1, as well as T2. Because of this, the pattern of correspondence effects in the RT data was similar to that in Experiment 2, although the magnitude was slightly smaller. Because the SOA functions within each experiment show that the correspondence effects for RT1 and RT2 decreased in magnitude as SOA increased, the inference is that any factor that decreases the temporal overlap of the processing for the two tasks will reduce the magnitude of the correspondence effects.
Relations to Previous Studies
Recently, Logan and Gordon (2001) proposed a mathematical model to account for task-switching and crosstalk effects in the dual-task paradigm. Two lines of argument were developed in their model. First, they assumed that a change of task parameters for T1 is triggered by the onset of S1 but a change of task parameters for T2 is triggered by the completion of response selection for T1. They further stated, "When SOA was longer than RT1, some or all of the parameters could be transmitted before S2" (p. 410), which implies that the changing of task parameters to prepare for T2 can start before the onset of S2 (at least when participants have full task foreknowledge for T2). If the change of task parameters for T2 can completely take place before the onset of S2, this model predicts no switch cost on T2 should be found when S2 is presented far enough after R1 has been selected. According to Logan and Gordon's characterization, one would expect to see an overadditive interaction between task transition (repeat vs. switch) and SOA in the full foreknowledge condition (the present Experiment 3, in which the average RT1 was smaller than 800 ms of the longest SOA). Contrary to this expectation, we found an additive effect of task transition and SOA in the full foreknowledge condition. Because Logan and Gordon only considered the case of full task foreknowledge, their model does not address the additivity of switch cost and SOA obtained in our Experiments 1 and 2, for which there was either no task foreknowledge or partial task foreknowledge.
The second line of argument in Logan and Gordon's (2001) model is for crosstalk effects in the PRP paradigm. Because the two stimuli are presented close together in time in the PRP situation, participants have to figure out which response goes with which stimulus (i.e., the dual-task binding problem). Logan and Gordon's model resolves the dual-task binding problem by giving initial priority to S1 until R1 has been selected and then changing stimulus set from T1 to T2 (see also De Jong, 1995) . Even though S1 is given priority, S2 is assumed to still have a small amount of priority and, consequently, to activate (weakly) the corresponding categorization (e.g., odd or even in the digit task). Consequently, S2 can produce a crosstalk correspondence effect at the level of categorizations when T1 and T2 are the same task (e.g., the time to categorize S1 as odd will be faster if S2 is odd than if S2 is even). However, no correspondence effect should occur when T1 and T2 are different tasks (e.g., the time to categorize S1 as odd will not depend on whether S2 is a vowel or consonant; see also Logan & Schulkind, 2000 , for supporting findings) because, in addition to the low stimulus priority, the categorizations associated with S2 also have low priority. In general, Logan and Gordon's model assumes that the crosstalk occurs primarily at the stimulus categorization level not at the response level that our S-R association account suggests. Thus, although their model accounts for why there were no response correspondence effects on task-switch trials when full task foreknowledge was provided in the present Experiment 3, the model does not provide a straightforward explanation for why those effects were observed when no or partial task foreknowledge was given in Experiments 1 and 2 (though presumably it could be modified to do so).
Another model for dual-task performance in which the central processing of the two tasks overlaps has been proposed by Tombu and Jolicoeur (2003) . They modified the traditional central bottle-neck model (see Figure 1A) to allow for the possibility that the central processing, B1, for the first task can go on concurrently with the central processing, B2, for the second task. During the interval in which both are executing, they each go on at a slower rate. For example, if half the capacity is allocated to B1 and half to B2, then each is executed at half its ordinary rate; that is, each takes twice as long to do one unit of work. If B1 and B2 execute concurrently this way, Tombu and Jolicoeur pointed out that decreasing SOA will increase RT1. In our experiments, SOA had no significant effect on RT1. Evidently, in our experiments central capacity was not shared in the manner proposed by Tombu and Jolicoeur.
Conclusion
The results obtained in the present experiments lead us to two different sources for the effects of task foreknowledge on switch cost and correspondence effect in the PRP paradigm. For T2, the switch cost is the same across SOAs regardless of whether the tasks to be performed are known in advance throughout an entire block of trials. To explain the invariance, we proposed that switching T2 from T1 is accompanied by a task-set reconfiguration that occurs after the SOA and after the central processing of T1 (see Figure 5 ).
Correspondence effects tend to be smaller when T2 switches from T1, being totally absent on switch trials when the particular tasks to be performed for T1 and T2 are known in advance. This interaction of correspondence and task transition is assumed to be due to response activation prior to the central bottleneck. The activation produced by classification analyzers can be restricted to the appropriate set of responses only when the foreknowledge of task provides sufficient information for this. Taken together, these three experiments demonstrate the importance of the relationship between the task-switch and correspondence effects in the PRP paradigm. As discussed previously, neither the traditional taskswitching models nor the classical PRP bottleneck models are able to account for the current findings, although they could be modified to do so. The results reported in this study argue in favor of an S-R association account of correspondence effects and in favor of the hypothesis that task-set reconfiguration for T2 does not proceed until the completion of central processing of T1.
